Robustness of interdependent networks under targeted attack by Huang, Xuqing et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
01
0.
21
60
v3
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
10
Robustness of interdependent networks under targeted attack
Xuqing Huang,1 Jianxi Gao,1,2 Sergey V. Buldyrev,3 Shlomo Havlin,4 and H.Eugene Stanley1
1Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics,
Boston University, Boston, MA 02215 USA
2Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University,
800 Dongchuan Road, Shanghai, 200240, PR China
3Department of Physics, Yeshiva University, New York, NY 10033 USA
4Minerva Center and Department of Physics,
Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel
Abstract
When an initial failure of nodes occurs in interdependent networks, a cascade of failure between
the networks occurs. Earlier studies focused on random initial failures. Here we study the robust-
ness of interdependent networks under targeted attack on high or low degree nodes. We introduce
a general technique and show that the targeted-attack problem in interdependent networks can be
mapped to the random-attack problem in a transformed pair of interdependent networks. We find
that when the highly connected nodes are protected and have lower probability to fail, in contrast
to single scale free (SF) networks where the percolation threshold pc = 0, coupled SF networks
are significantly more vulnerable with pc significantly larger than zero. The result implies that
interdependent networks are difficult to defend by strategies such as protecting the high degree
nodes that have been found useful to significantly improve robustness of single networks.
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Modern systems due to technological progress are becoming more and more mutually
coupled and depend on each other to provide proper functionality [1–3]. Social disruptions
caused by recent disasters, ranging from hurricanes to large-scale power outages and terrorist
attacks, have shown that the most dangerous vulnerability is hiding in the many interdepen-
dencies across different networks [4]. The question of robustness of interdependent networks
has recently become of interest [5–8]. In interdependent networks, nodes from one network
depend on nodes from another network and vice versa. Consequently, when nodes from one
network fail they cause nodes in the other network to fail too. When some initial failure of
nodes happens, this may trigger a recursive process of cascading failures that can completely
fragment both networks.
Recently, a theoretical framework was developed [7] to study the process of cascading
failures in interdependent network caused by random initial failure of nodes. They show that
due to the coupling between networks, interdependent networks are extremely vulnerable
to random failure. However, when we consider real scenarios, initial failure is mostly not
random. It may be due to a targeted attack on important central nodes. It can also occur to
low central nodes because important central nodes are purposely defended, e.g. in internet
networks, heavily connected hubs are purposely more secured. Indeed, it was shown that
targeted attacks on high degree nodes [9–13] or high betweeness nodes [14] in single networks
have dramatic effect on their robustness. The question of robustness of interdependent
networks under targeted attack or defense has not been addressed.
In this Letter, we develop a mathematical framework for understanding the robustness
of interdependent networks under initial targeted attack which depends on degree of nodes.
The framework is based on a general technique we develop to solve targeted attack problems
in networks by mapping them to random attack problems. A value Wα(ki) is assigned to
each node, which represents the probability that a node i with ki links is initially attacked
and become inactive. We focus on the family of functions [12]
Wα(ki) =
kαi∑N
i=1 k
α
i
,−∞ < α < +∞. (1)
When α > 0, nodes with higher degree are more vulnerable and those nodes are intention-
ally attacked, while for α < 0, nodes with higher degree are defended and so have lower
probability to fail. The case α = 0, W0 =
1
N
, represents the random removal of nodes [7]
and the case α → ∞ represents the targeted attack case where nodes are removed strictly
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in the order from high degree to low degree. For the α < 0 case, nodes with zero degree
should be removed before analysis begins.
Our model consists of two networks, A and B, with the same number of nodes, N . The
N nodes in each network are connected to nodes in the other network by bidirectional
dependency links, thereby establishing a one-to-one correspondence. The functioning of a
A-node in network A depends on the functioning of the corresponding B-node in network
B and vice versa. Within each network, the nodes are randomly connected with degree
distributions PA(k) and PB(k) respectively. We begin by studying the situation where only
network A is attacked. We initially remove a fraction, 1 − p, of the A-nodes of network A
with probability Wα(ki) (Eq.(1)) and remove all the A-links that connect to those removed
nodes. As nodes and links are sequentially removed, network A begins to fragment into
connected components. Nodes that are not connected to the giant component are considered
inactive and are removed. Owing to the dependence between the networks, all the B-nodes
in network B that are connected to the removed A-nodes in network A are then also removed.
Network B also begins to fragment into connected components and only the nodes in the
giant component are kept. Then network B spreads damage back to network A. The damage
is spreaded between network A and B, back and forth until they completely fragment or
arrive to a mutually connected component and no further removal of nodes and links occurs.
The main idea of our approach is to find an equivalent network A′, such that the targeted
attack problem on interdependent networks A and B can be solved as a random attack prob-
lem on interdependent networks A′ and B. We start by finding the new degree distribution
of network A after removing, according to Eq.(1), 1−p fraction of nodes but before the links
of the remaining nodes which connect to the removed nodes are removed. Let Ap(k) be the
number of nodes with degree k and Pp(k) be the new degree distribution of the remaining
fraction p of nodes in network A,
Pp(k) =
Ap(k)
pN
. (2)
When another node is removed, Ap(k) changes as
A(p−1/N)(k) = Ap(k)−
Pp(k)k
α
< k(p)α >
, (3)
where < k(p)α >≡
∑
Pp(k)k
α. In the limit of N →∞, Eq.(3) can be presented in terms of
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derivative of Ap(k) with respect to p,
dAp(k)
dp
= N
Pp(k)k
α
< k(p)α >
. (4)
Differentiating Eq.(2) with respect to p and using Eq.(4), we obtain
− p
dPp(k)
dp
= Pp(k)−
Pp(k)k
α
< k(p)α >
, (5)
which is exact for N → ∞. In order to solve Eq.(5), we define a function Gα(x) ≡
∑
k P (k)x
kα, and substitue f ≡ G−1α (p). We find by direct differentiation that [20]
Pp(k) = P (k)
fk
α
Gα(f)
=
1
p
P (k)fk
α
, (6)
< k(p)α >=
fG′α(f)
Gα(f)
, (7)
satisfy the Eq.(5). With this degree distribution, the generating function of the nodes left
in network A before removing the links to the removed nodes is
GAb(x) ≡
∑
k
Pp(k)x
k =
1
p
∑
k
P (k)fk
α
xk. (8)
On the other hand, the fraction of the orginal links that connect to the nodes left is
p˜ ≡
pN < k(p) >
N < k >
=
∑
k P (k)kf
kα
∑
k P (k)k
, (9)
where < k > is the average degree of the original network A, < k(p) > is the average degree
of remaining nodes before the links that are disconnected are removed. So the generating
function of the new degree distribution of the nodes left in network A after their links to
the removed nodes are also removed is [21]
GAc(x) ≡ GAb(1− p˜+ p˜x). (10)
The only difference in the cascading process under targeted attack from the case under
random attack is the first stage where the initial attack is exerted on the network A. If we
find a network A′ with generating function G˜A0(x), such that after a random attack with
(1−p) fraction of removed, the generating function of nodes left in A′ is the same as GAc(x),
then the targeted attack problem on interdependent networks A and B can be solved as a
random attack problem on interdependent networks A′ and B. We find G˜A0(x) by solving
the equation G˜A0(1− p+ px) = GAc(x) and from Eq.(10),
G˜A0(x) = GAb(1 +
p˜
p
(x− 1)). (11)
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Up to now, we have mapped the problem of cascade of failures of nodes in interdependent
networks caused by initial targeted attack to the problem of random attack. We can see that
the evolution of equations only depends on the generating function of network A, but not on
any information about how the two networks interact with each other. Thus, this approach
can be generally applied to study both single networks and other interdependent network
models.
Next we can apply the framework developed in Ref. [7], gA(p) = 1− G˜A0[1− p(1− fA)],
where fA is a function of p that satisfies the transcendental equation fA = G˜A1[1−p(1−fA)].
Analogous equations exist for network B. As the interdependent networks achieve a mutually
connected giant component, the fraction of nodes left in giant component is p∞. The system
satisfies the equations
x = pgA(y),
y = pgB(x),
(12)
where the two unknown variables x and y satisfy p∞ = xgB(x) = ygA(y). Eliminating y
from these equations, we obtain a single equation
x = pgA[pgB(x)]. (13)
The critical case (p = pc) emerges when both sides of this equation have equal derivatives,
1 = p2
dgA
dx
[pgB(x)]
dgB
dx
(x)|x=xc,p=pc. (14)
which, together with Eq.(13), yields the solution for pc and the critical size of the giant mu-
tually connected component, p∞(pc) = xcgB(xc). In general, there is no explicit expression
as a solution and pc and xc can be found numerically.
We now analyze the specific classes of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [15, 16] and scale-free (SF) [17–
19] networks. The lines in Fig. 1 represent the critical thresholds, pc, for coupled coupled
SF networks with different α obtained by solutions of Eq.(13) and Eq.(14), which are in
excellent agreement with simulations. Several conclusions from Fig. 1 are as follows: (i)
Remarkably, while pc for a single SF network approaches to 0 quickly when α becomes
zero or negative (see also [12]), pc for interdependent networks is non-zero for the entire
range of α (Fig. 1(a)). This follows from the fact that failure of the least connected nodes
in one network may lead to failure of well connected nodes in the other network, which
makes interdependent networks significantly more difficult to protect compared to a single
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network. (ii) targeted attacks (α > 0) and defense strategies (α < 0) are more effective
for interdependent networks with broader degree distributions. In Fig. 1(b), comparing the
lines of λ = 2.5, λ = 2.8 and λ = 3.4 with m = 2, one can see that the lower is λ the more
sensitive is pc to the change of α. Accordingly, robustness of interdependent networks with
broader degree distributions decreases more under the same targeted attacks.
Simplified forms for GAb(x), GAc(x) and G˜A0(x) from Eqs.(8),(10) and (11) exist when
α = 1,
GAb(x) =
1
p
∑
k
P (k)fkxk =
1
p
GA0(fx), (15)
GAc(x) =
1
p
GA0(f(1− p˜+ p˜x)), (16)
G˜A0(x) =
1
p
GA0(
p˜
p
f(x− 1) + f). (17)
where GA0(x) is the original generating function of the network A, f = G
−1
A0(p) and p˜ =
G′
A0
(f)
G′
A0
(1)
f .
Explicit solutions of percolation quantities exist for the case of interdependent Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi networks, when α = 1 and both of the two networks are initially attacked simuta-
neously. The two networks originally have generating functions GA0(x) andGB0(x). Initially,
(1 − p1) and (1 − p2) fraction of nodes are targeted (according to Eq. (1) and α = 1) and
removed from network A and B respectively. Similarly, we start by finding the equivalent
networks A′ and B′ such that a fraction (1 − p1p2) of random initial attack on both of the
networks has the same effect as (1 − p1) and (1 − p2) fraction of nodes are intentionally
removed from network A and network B respectively. After removal of initially failed nodes
and all the links that connect to the removed nodes, according to Eq.(16), the generating
function of the nodes left in network A is
GAc(x) =
1
p1
GA0(f1(1− p˜1 + p˜1x)), (18)
where f1 ≡ G
−1
A0(p1), p˜1 ≡ f1
G′
A0
(f1)
G′
A0
(1)
. Furthermore, (1−p2) fraction of the remaining A-nodes
are randomly removed. Because each remaining A-node’s corresponding B-node in network
B has a possibility (1 − p2) to be initially attacked, which leads to fail this A-node. The
generating function of the nodes left in network A is
GAd(x) ≡ GAc(1− p2 + p2x) =
1
p1
GA0(f1 + p˜1f1p2(x− 1)). (19)
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Now we can find the generating function of the equivalent network A′ by G˜A0(1 − p1p2 +
p1p2x) = GAd(x):
G˜A0(x) =
1
p1
GA0(
p˜1
p1
f1(x− 1) + f1). (20)
The same holds for network B′.
For ER networks, the generating function is G0(x) = e
<k>(x−1) [21], so f1 =
ln(p1)
<k>1
+1,f2 =
ln(p2)
<k>2
+ 1, G˜A0(x) = G˜A1(x) = e
<k>1f21 (x−1) and G˜B0(x) = G˜B1(x) = e
<k>2f22 (x−1). From
Eq.(12),
x = p1p2gA(y) = p1p2(1− fA),
y = p1p2gB(x) = p1p2(1− fB),
(21)
where
fA = e
<k>1f21 y(fA−1),
fB = e
<k>2f22x(fB−1).
(22)
In the case < k >1=< k >2=< k > and p1 = p2 = p, we find that
p∞ = p
2(1− e<k>f
2p∞). (23)
where f1 = f2 ≡ f =
ln(p)
<k>
+ 1, and pc satisfies relation:
< k > p2cfc = 2.4554, (24)
with fc =
ln(pc)
<k>
+ 1. Fig. 2 shows that the simulation confirms well the theory. Compared
to the case of random attack on one network, where pc = 2.4554/ < k > [7], in Eq.(24),
the factor fc reflects the effect of targeted attack on high degree nodes to increase pc.
The term p2c in Eq.(24) is since we are initially attacking both networks simutaneously
instead of only attacking one network. Indeed for the case of initial random attack on
two networks simultaneously, from Eq.(21) and fA = e
<k>1y(fA−1), fB = e
<k>1y(fB−1) [7] we
obtain < k > p2c = 2.4554.
In summary, we developed a theoretical framework for understanding the robusteness of
interdependent networks under targeted attacks on specific degree nodes. We introduce a
method and show that targeted-attack problems in networks can be mapped to random-
attack problems by transforming the networks which are under initial attack. It provides a
routine method (if the random-attack case is solvable) to study the targeted-attack problems
in both single networks and randomly connected and uncorrelated interdependent networks,
i.e. (i) the case of three or more interdependent networks, (ii) the case of partially coupled
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interdependent networks, (iii) the case in which a node from network A can depend on more
than one node from network B. By applying the method, we find that in contrast to single
networks, when the highly connected nodes are defended (α < 0), the percolation threshold
pc has a finite non-zero value which is significantly larger than zero. For example, when
the degrees of all nodes are known and nodes can only be damaged from lower degree to
high degree (α → −∞), pc ≈ 0.46 for coupled SF networks with λ = 2.8 and < k >= 4
while pc for the same single SF network is 0 (Fig. 1). The implications of the present study
are dramatic. The current methods applied to design robust networks and improve the
robustness of current networks, i.e. protecting the high degree nodes, need to be modified
to apply to interdependent network systems.
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FIG. 1: (a) Dependence of pc on α for SF single and interdependent networks with average
degree < k >= 4. The lower cut-off of the degree is m = 2. The horizontal lines represent
the upper and lower limits of pc. The black dashed line represents pc for SF free network. (b)
Values of pc vs α for SF interdependent networks with different λ and lower cut-off m = 2.
The λ in the legends of both the graphs are approximate numbers.
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FIG. 2: Values of p∞ vs p when both networks are initially attacked. Both networks in the
interdependent networks are ER or SF networks with the same average degree. The symbols
represent simulation data (N = 106 nodes). The solid lines are theoretical predictions,
Eq.(23). The dashed line represents simulation data for interdependent scale-free networks
with λ = 2.8, < k >= 4. All results are for α = 1. Inset: Values of pc vs average degree of
ER networks. The symbols represent simulation data, while the line is the theory, Eq.(24).
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